Jonas Nick, Bitcoin researcher at Blockstream, has introduced SHRIMPS, a proposed stateful post-quantum (PQ) signature scheme designed to support secure signing across multiple devices while maintaining relatively compact signature sizes.
Nick described SHRIMPS as a hash-based construction that allows multiple devices initialized from the same seed to independently generate signatures, typically around 2.5 KB in size.
Please welcome SHRIMPS🦐 to the family of stateful PQ signatures:
— Jonas Nick (@n1ckler) March 30, 2026
2.5 KB hash-based sigs across multiple devices.
SHRINCS🛋️ gave ~324-byte sigs but is single-device. SHRIMPS🦐 addresses multi-device; any device loaded from the same seed creates sigs 3x smaller than SLH-DSA pic.twitter.com/Y1F1MTrxVQ
The proposal builds on earlier work such as SHRINCS, which produces smaller signatures but is limited to a single-device setup due to state management constraints.
SHRIMPS is designed to remove that limitation by allowing independent signing across multiple devices while maintaining security within a predefined bound.
The approach assumes an upper limit on the number of devices derived from a single seed, which helps preserve the integrity of the scheme.
Technically, the construction combines two SPHINCS+ instances under a single public key.
A compact signing path is used for initial signatures, while a fallback path supports additional usage, allowing the system to balance efficiency and flexibility.
Under typical parameters, SHRIMPS signatures are around 2.5 KB at 128-bit security, which is smaller than stateless alternatives such as SLH-DSA, where signatures can reach roughly 7.8 KB.
The proposal also outlines a hybrid model with SHRINCS, where a primary device can generate smaller signatures, while backup devices use SHRIMPS to maintain multi-device functionality.
The design may have applications in systems such as Bitcoin wallets, where keys are typically used for a limited number of signatures and multi-device configurations are common.
The research comes amid renewed discussion around quantum computing and its potential long-term impact on cryptographic systems, including Bitcoin.
While practical quantum attacks remain widely considered years or decades away, post-quantum signature research continues to explore ways to mitigate theoretical risks and improve flexibility in real-world wallet setups.
Proposals such as SHRIMPS reflect ongoing efforts to develop quantum-resistant alternatives, directly addressing long-term concerns raised in discussions around potential quantum threats to Bitcoin.
Separately, commentary surrounding a recent Google-related quantum research discussion has drawn attention on social media.
One widely circulated post highlighted that a co-author referenced as a “Bitcoin security researcher” is affiliated with the Ethereum Foundation, and questioned the neutrality of conclusions suggesting potential vulnerabilities in Bitcoin’s cryptography.
A co-author on Google's quantum paper calls himself a "Bitcoin security researcher." He actually works for the Ethereum Foundation.
— TFTC (@TFTC21) March 31, 2026
Then at the end of his own thread about breaking Bitcoin's cryptography, he casually drops that "Bitcoin PoW is cooked." Totally unbiased… https://t.co/sl5qkGQMoC pic.twitter.com/ltA6cTY2ny